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Operation Inherent Resolve and the
Reemergence of the Debate Over the War
Powers Resolution
by KYLE C. WALKER*

Few areas of constitutional law have produced as
much heated debate as the war powers area, heat
produced in no small part by the passionate belief that
this is a subject of incalculable consequence.'
Introduction
Over the course of the last several months, President Obama has
launched a broad military offensive against the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant ("ISIL").2 At this point, Operation Inherent Resolve
consists primarily of air-strikes conducted by United States armed
forces and coalition members-it remains to been seen the extent to
which United States ground forces will be needed for the operation.
One particularly interesting component of this military action is the
initial justifications President Obama provided with respect to his
authority to order this air campaign in the first place-until recently,
he relied on statutory authorization in the form of the Authorization
to Use Military Force passed within a week of the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, as well as the 2002 Authorization to Use

* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
2012, University of California Santa Barbara, Political Science. I am immensely grateful
for the support of my friends and family throughout the process of writing this Note. A
special thanks to the editors of CLQ for their help finalizing this Note.
1. William Michael Treanor, The War Powers Outside the Courts, 81 IND. L.J. 1333,
1333 (2006).
2. This operation has been given the title: OperationInherent Resolve.
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Iraq.3

Military Force in
Additionally, President Obama has loosely
cited his constitutional authority as commander in chief to protect
American citizens and promote national security abroad.
In a letter to Congress, President Obama indicated his statutory
authority, relying specifically on both the 2001 and the 2002
Authorizations to Use Military Force, to commit United States armed
forces abroad without consultation, or express approval, of Congress:
I have ordered the implementation of a new
comprehensive
and
sustained
counterterrorism
strategy to degrade, and ultimately defeat, ISIL. As
part of this strategy, I have directed the deployment of
475 additional U.S. armed forces personnel to Iraq,
and I have determined that it is necessary and
appropriate to use the U.S. Armed Forces to conduct
coordination with Iraqi forces and to provide training,
communications support, intelligence support, and
other support, to select elements of the Iraqi security
forces .... I have also ordered the U.S. Armed Forces
to conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes and
other necessary actions against these terrorists in Iraq
and Syria.
I have directed these actions.., pursuant to my
constitutional and statutory authority as Commander
in Chief... and as Chief Executive, as well as my
constitutional and statutory authority to conduct the
foreign relations of the United States.4
In light of the War Powers Resolution ("WPR"), many have
criticized President Obama's reliance on the AUMF in Iraq as

3. President Obama has since provided Congress with a draft of a new joint
resolution authorizing the use of military force with respect to ISIL specifically. See Draft
authorization: Authorization for Use of military Force against the Islamic State and the
Levant, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files

/docs/aumf_02112015.pdf.
4. Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, THE WHITE HOUSE: OFFICE OF THE PRESS

SECRETARY (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/
letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq.
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statutory authority to commit armed forces in the fight against ISIL
as, at best, a legal stretch.'
This Note asserts that, with some modification, the WPR can
serve as a meaningful mechanism by which the President is able to
consult with Congress before making the decision to commit United
States armed forces to conflicts abroad. Part I introduces the history
and background of the WPR, including a brief overview of how the
Constitution splits the war powers between the President and
Congress, and provides an introduction with respect to the pertinent
parts of the WPR.
In Part II, this Note provides a broad overview of the scholarly
debate with respect to war powers, specifically within the context of
the WPR. This debate offers, on the one hand, a pro-Congress
understanding of the war powers provided by the Constitution, and
on the other, a pro-Executive interpretation of the war powers
provided by the Constitution. This Note advocates for the former.
Part III discusses why the WPR is problematic in practice, and
Part IV provides an evaluation of the WPR as applied to Operation
Inherent Resolve. Lastly, Part V provides various ways in which the
WPR can be strengthened to better align the practical use of the
WPR, and its ultimate goal of facilitating cooperation between the
executive and the legislature without undermining the constitutional
powers they enjoy.
Specifically, this Note advocates that the WPR be amended so as
to (1) establish a permanent consultation group to facilitate
communication between the President and Congress, (2) shorten the
sixty to ninety day time limitation set-up under the congressional
actions and procedures section 6 of the WPR; and (3) amend the WPR
so as to require that an expiration date be placed on all Congressional
authorization to use military force.
I. History and Background of the War Powers Resolution
War powers are divided between Congress and the President
under the United States Constitution. Article I, Section 8 confers on
Congress the power to make declarations of war, control war funding,
and raise and support the armed forces Furthermore, Congress has
5. See Deb Riechman & Nedra Pickler, Obama to Send His New War Powers
Request to Capitol Hill, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 10, 2015, 7:02 PM), http://www.ne
wsmax.com/Newsfront/obama-to-send-war/2015/02/lO/id/623777/.
6.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (2015).

7.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 11.
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the power "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution... all other Powers vested by the
Constitution in the Government of the United States .... "' Under
Article II, Section 2, the President is commander in chief of the
military, "when called into the actual Service of the United States."9
This division of power, however, is not always clear-one major
concern is the extent of the President's war power to deploy armed
forces abroad without the express approval, via declaration of war or
otherwise, of Congress.
Following the Vietnam war, the WPR was adopted in the form of
a congressional joint resolution' to not only address concerns about
the extent of the President's power to commit United States forces
abroad without the consent of Congress, but also to provide a set of
procedures for the President and Congress to follow in situations
where the introduction of United States forces abroad could lead to
their involvement in armed conflict."
Conceptually, the WPR can be
12
broken into six distinct parts:
1. Purpose and policy; 3
4
2. The consultation requirement;'
3. The reporting requirement; 5
4. Congressional actions and procedures; 6
5. Rules and definitions in interpretation of the WPR; 7 and
6. The "separability provision."' 8
The policy behind the WPR is clear: "to fulfill the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the
collective judgment of both Congress and the President will apply,"
8.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.

9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1-2.
10. H.R.J. Res. 543, 93rd Cong. (1973) (enacted). Passed over President Nixon's
veto in November of 1973.
11. This joint resolution is codified in the United States Code in Title 50, Chapter 33,
Section(s) 1541-48.
12. War Powers Overview, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Feb. 16, 2015, 12:32 PM),
http://loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php.
13. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2015).
14. 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (2015).
15. 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (2015).
16. 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (2015).
17. 50 U.S.C. § 1547 (2015).
18. 50 U.S.C. § 1548 (2015).
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not only with respect to the "introduction" of United States Forces
into hostile situations, but also where "imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances."' 1 9 In this regard,
the President is limited in his exercise as commander in chief of the
armed forces either pursuant to a declaration of war, after having
been granted statutory authorization from Congress, or following a
"national emergency created by attack upon the United States."2 °
Under § 1542, the President is required "in every possible
instance to consult with Congress before introducing United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent
by
the
indicated
in hostilities
is clearly
involvement
Furthermore, the President is required to
circumstances[.] '' 2'
regularly consult with Congress "until United States armed forces are
no longer engaged in hostilities .22 To complement the consultation
requirement in § 1542, absent a declaration of war, the President must
comply with the reporting requirements set forth in § 1543 "in any
case in which United States armed forces are introduced."23 The
President must, within forty-eight hours of the introduction of United
States armed forces, report to Congress "the circumstances
necessitating the introduction," "the constitutional and legislative
authority under which such introduction took place," and the
"estimated scope and duration" of the involvement.24
Congressional actions and procedures are set out in § 1544 of the
law. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this section is that it
requires United States armed forces to be withdrawn from hostilities
"[w]ithin sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required
to be submitted pursuant to § 1543(a)(1) of this title, whichever is
earlier., 25 Additionally, § 1544(c) requires the President to remove

19.
20.

50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2015) (emphasis added).
50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2015).

21.
22.

50 U.S.C. § 1542 (2015) (emphasis added).
50 U.S.C. § 1542 (2015).

23.

50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (2015).

24.
25.

50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(3) (2015).
50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2015).
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United States armed forces that are not engaged in hostilities at any
time Congress so directs by a Concurrent Resolution.26
Lastly, the "separability provision" states: "if any portion of this
chapter of the application thereof to any person or circumstances is
held invalid [by a court], the remainder of the chapter and the
application of such provision 27to any other person or circumstance
shall not be affected thereby.,
Presidents have submitted over one-hundred and thirty reports
to Congress in the nearly four decades since the passage of the
WPR.2 Still, the WPR has been subject to numerous proposals to
either modify or repeal the resolution. Furthermore, "[d]ebate
continues on whether using the WPR is effective as a means of
assuring congressional participation in decisions that might
get the
29
United States involved in a significant military conflict.,
II. Congressional Action Serves as a Substantive Restriction on
the President's Power to Use Military Force
One of the main challenges to the WPR rests on differing
interpretations of how the Constitution allocates war powers between
the President and Congress. There is no debate that the framers of
the Constitution realized the necessity to check the President's ability
to wage war. However, the Constitution itself fails to establish a
"comprehensive system for the conduct of foreign and military
affairs"; some powers are allocated to the President, others to
Congress.30 In this regard, the debate arises with respect to the
allocation of the war powers between Congress and the President.
Legal scholars who argue that the Declare War Clause provides
comprehensive war powers to Congress point not only to a strict
26. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (2015). This is subject to the exception that Congress has
either "(1) declared war or has enacted a specific statutory authorization for such use of
United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is
physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attach upon the United States." Id. It is
worth noting that the procedure set up under § 1544(c) is a "legislative veto" insofar as
concurrent resolutions are not laws and are not presented to the President for signature or
veto; a procedure that is questionable in light of the Court's decision in I.N.S v. Chada.
See I.N.S v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

27. 50 U.S.C. § 1548 (2015).
28. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
PRESIDENTIAL
COMPLIANCE, (Congressional Research Service Sept. 25, 2012), http://fas.org/sgp/crs /nat

sec/RL33532.pdf.

29.

Id.

30. Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President under the War
Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 91,83 (1985).
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reading of the Constitutional text, but supplement this with
discussions reflecting how the framers envisioned the balance of
power in the Constitution;3" such as this excerpt from James
Madison's Helvidius, number 4:
In no part of the [C]onstitution is more wisdom to
found than in the clause which confides the question of
war and peace to the legislature, and not to the
executive department. Besides the objection to such
mixture of heterogeneous powers: the trust and the
temptation would be too great for any one man; not
such as nature may offer as the prodigy of many
centuries, but such as may be expected in the ordinary
successions of magistracy ....It is in war, finally, that
laurels are to be gathered, and it is the executive brow
they are to encircle. The strongest passions, and most
dangerous weaknesses of the human breast... are all
in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace."
Generally, those who align themselves with this pro-Congress
approach to war powers call for Congressional approval for any type
of military force, unless the nation is acting in self-defense. As
indicated, this view is based largely on a strict reading of the
Constitution's Declare War Clause,33 but also relies on various
interpretations of the drafting of the Constitution.4
Legal scholars such as John C. Yoo,35 who hold more expansive
(i.e., pro-executive) views of presidential power, critique the proCongress position of the war powers insofar as the text of the
Constitution only grants Congress "the power 'to declare war,' not

31.
(2002).

Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1552

32. THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, VOL. 15,24 MARCH 1793-20 APRIL 1795 10610 (Thomas A. Mason, et al. eds., Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia 1985),
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01 -15-02-0070.
33.
34.
(2002).

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
See John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1641

35. Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley; former Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, United State Department of Justice (2001-

2003).
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hostilities."'36

the power 'to authorize
Yoo argues that "a more
comprehensive reading of the text and structure [of the Constitution]
demonstrates that the Constitution does not mandate a specified,
legalistic process for waging war."37 What is more, Yoo criticizes, the
"pro-Congress" understanding of the constitution-one in which
interprets the Constitution to require that Congress provide its
authorization before the United States can engage in military
hostilities-because it "ignores the constitutional text and structure,
errs in interpreting the ratification history of the Constitution, and
cannot account for the practice of the three branches of
government."38 Rather, Yoo argues that the Constitution creates a
"flexible system of war powers." 39 In this "flexible system," the
President enjoys "significant initiative as commander in chief," and
Congress is reserved the authority to "check executive policy through
its power of the purse.'
Despite this scholarly debate, one thing is clear: neither the
President or Congress enjoy complete allocation of war powers;
rather the text of the Constitution divides the war powers between
the President and Congress and "produces complex layers of checks
and balances in war powers, rather than entrusting war wholly to a
single branch., 4' Even supporters of the pro-Congress view of the
Constitution recognize that there are in fact some situations where
Congressional approval is not necessary-for example, "when the
nation ins under attack or to rescue a US citizen abroad. 4 2 Yet the
fundamental issue remains: how do we determine when the
43 President
can act unilaterally and what are the limits to this power?
This is arguably where the WPR comes into play-as a
mechanism by which the President is given some leeway in his acts as
commander in chief, while at the same time facilitating some sort of
cooperation between Congress and the President when it comes time
to make the decision to commit United States armed forces abroad.

36. Ramsey, supra note 31, at 1552 (discussing the need to determine how the
Constitution initially made the basic allocation or war powers before coming to a
consensus of how to apply them to "complicated modern events").
37. Yoo, supra note 34, at 1639.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1640.
40. Id.
41. Ramsey, supra note 31, at 1638.
42. Treanor, supra note 1, at 1335.
43. See id.

Win ter 20161

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

In this regard, the WPR in no way seeks to "define or modify the
constitutional powers of the President." 44 Rather, as Cyrus Vance"
deftly points out, the WPR "establishes a procedure by which
Congress can express its institutional judgment" and question the
degree of Presidential war powers.46 What remains unclear is just how
expansive the Presidential power as commander in chief is, as well as
to what degree, and when, might congressional consultation needed
before committing United States armed forces abroad.
In Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case,
Jackson articulated that "the art of governing under our Constitution
does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power and
any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles
from context[;]" the Constitution "diffuses power ... to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government. ''47 What is more, Justice Jackson
identified that "[p]residential powers are not fixed, but fluctuate upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress., 48 To
highlight this interpretation of presidential power in relation to
Justice Jackson identified three zones of
congressional power,
49
presidentialpower:
1. "When the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is
at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses
in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.
In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be
said ...to personify the federal sovereignty. If his
these
under
unconstitutional
held
act is
circumstances, it usually means that the Federal
Government as an undivided whole lacks power.
the consultation requirement."

44. Vance, supra note 30, at 85.
45. Former United States Secretary of the Army (Kennedy); United States Deputy
Secretary of Defense (Johnson); and United States Secretary of State (Carter).
46. Vance, supra note 30, at 85 (emphasis added).
47. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, (Steel Seizure) 342 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 635.
49. Comment, Congressional Control of Presidential War-Making Under the War
Powers Act: The Status of a Legislative Veto After Chada, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1217, 1235
(1984) (emphasis added).
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2. "When the President acts in the absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can
only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in when he and Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes,
at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite
measure on independent presidential responsibility.
In this area, any actual test of power is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law."
3. "When the President takes measure incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional
powers
over
the
matter...
[p]residential claim to a power at once so conclusive
and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for
what is at stake is the equilibrium established by
our constitutional system."50
In this regard, "the constitutionality of presidential action must
be judged by the scope of the President's independent authority...
and by the restraints that may legitimately be placed upon
presidential exercise of that power by the other branches."'" Relying
on this view, the WPR is not a delegation of congressional war
powers to the President; rather, the act recognizes "that these powers
are shared by Congress and the President, with the President's
powers falling into [Justice] Jackson's 'zone of twilight."'52
These are just some of the questions that must be considered
against the backdrop of the realities of modern times-Congress has
not formally declared war since World War II, instead we have
"witnesses frequent hostilities initiated by the President with little or
no congressional authorization[,]" 53 and yet, there seems to be "no

50.
51.
52.
53.

Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635-38.
Comment, supra note 49, at 1236.
Id.
See Ramsey, supra note 31, at 1548.
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practice under which a
political constituency clamoring for a different
54
necessary.,
be
would
war
of
declaration
III. Why the War Powers Resolution is Problematic, Generally
As Richard Grimmett55 points out, one major issue involving the
WPR is the consultation requirement-not only is it open to
interpretation as to when consultation is required, but also the
meaning of the term "consultation" is up for debate.56 A noticeable
trend is that the executive branch may feel that it has fulfilled the
requirement, while Congress does not.57 The House report on the
WPR indicates that "consultation in this provision means that a
decision is pending on a problem and that Members of Congress are
being asked by the President for their advice opinions and, in
appropriate circumstances, their approval of action contemplated."58
Yet another concern is who should represent Congress for
consultation purposes-while critics of the existing statute have
"introduced proposals to specify a consultation group[,] ... Congress
has yet to act on such a proposal. '' 51 Many scholars have pointed out
that while the WPR clearly calls for Congressional consultation
before introducing United States armed forces abroad, this goal is not
being realized in practice-the President often fails to initiate any
meaningful discussions with Congress before introducing United
States armed forces abroad.60
Furthermore, Grimmett points out that Congress not only faces
"immediate issues... when the President introduces troops into
situations of potential hostilities," but also the "longer-term issue [of]
whether the WPR is working or should be amended.",6' In light of the
former, Congress generally has the following choices: 6

54. See Treanor, supranote 1, at 1334.
55. Richard Grimmett is a specialist in international security with the Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress.
56.
57.

GRIMMETI,supra note 28, at 26.
See id. at 23.

58. Id. at 26.
59. Id. at 23. (Note that the House report on the WPR "specifically called for
consultation between the President and the leadership and appropriate committees[,] ...
[however,] this was changed to less specific wording in final House-Senate conference
committee version, to provide some flexibility.)

60. Vance, supra note 30, at 88-90.
61.

GRIMMET, supra note 28, at 26.

62.

Id.
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1. Apply the WPR to terminate presidential action
that Congress does not agree with,63
2. Apply the WPR to "either legitimize the action and
strengthen it by making clear congressional support
for the measure or to establish the precedent does
apply in such situation[,]" 64
3. Refrain from applying the WPR out of fear that
invoking the Resolution will otherwise damper the
President's otherwise "flexible" war powers, 65 or
4. Refrain from applying the WPR because "some may
not wish to have a formal vote on either the issue of
applying the Resolution or the merits of utilizing
Armed Forces in that case."66
Most would agree that since its enactment, the WPR has had at
least somewhat of an influence on our government's policy-making
process-"[w]eary of the time limit on the commitment of troops
unauthorized by Congress and of the congressional veto provision...
a President contemplating armed action must weigh in advance the
likely political reaction., 67 This, however, has not achieved the
ultimate goal of the WPR: collective judgment.
The policy behind the WPR makes clear that its purpose is to
provide a mechanism by which Congress and the President can
exercise their respective war powers. The WPR, however, has
arguably failed to achieve the goal of cooperation between the two
branches. While the WPR is a sound concept, it is in need of
improvement; "with minor modification, it could more effectively
achieve its 6goal of requiring consultation between the President and
Congress.,
IV. Operation Inherent Resolve and the War Powers
Resolution
The application of the WPR in light of the current campaign
against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ("ISIL") illustrates

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Vance, supra note 30, at 90.
Id. at 91.
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both the impact of the WPR in relation to presidential war powers
nearly forty years after the WPR was enacted, as well as its flaws as a
mechanism by which the President at least consult with Congress
before engaging United States armed forces abroad. The opening
stages against ISIL consisted of a barrage of air strikes in an effort
that restricted largely to not only humanitarian missions, but also to
protect American personnel and facilities. During this timeframe,
President Obama relied heavily on his constitutional authority to
protect the American people. Within a few months, President
Obama announced a broader campaign to "degrade and ultimately
defeat" 69 ISIL. It was not until mid-September of 2014, that the
President officially notified Congress of his intention to rely on the
2001 and 2002 Authorizations to Use Military Force as statutory
justification for the air campaign against ISIL"' In a September 2014,
letter to Congress, President Obama specifically indicated that he, in
light of the "national security and foreign policy interest of the
United States" and "pursuant to [his] constitutional and statutory
authority as Commander in Chief (including the authority to carry
out Public Law 107-4072 and Public Law 107-2431)" had the authority
to commit United States armed forces abroad in the fight against ISIL
without a new express authorization from Congress. 3
October 7, 2014 marked sixty days since the beginning of the
bombing air campaign against ISIL strongholds in Iraq. 4 Bernadette
Meehan75 identified that "[b]ecause the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs
constitute specific authorization with the meaning of the [WPR], the76
[WPR]'s [sixty] day limitations on operations does not apply here.,
Moreover, Meehan indicated that the President had filed War Power
reports over the summer months of 2014, notifying both Congress and
the American people of the operation going on in the Middle East.

69. Supra note 3.
70. Prior to the White House invoking the Authorization to Use Military Force
Against Iraq as a statutory justification to conduct air strikes against ISIL, at least in some
cases, the Obama administration had called for repeal of the law.
71. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
72. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-243.
73. Supra note 3.
74. Spencer Ackerman, White House Says Expired War Powers Irrelevant to ISIS
Campaign, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2014, 3:53 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-new

s/2014/oct/15/white-house-war-powers-resolution-iraq.
75. Spokeswoman, National Security Council.
76. Ackerman, supra note 74.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 43:2

However, reliance on the nearly fifteen-year-old authorization
unsurprisingly caught the attention of legal scholars across the
country. Mary O'Connell, an international law professor at the
University of Notre Dame, said that President Obama was "in clear
violation" of the WPR;77 while other critics have said that the78
President's reliance on the old AUMF(s) is a "legal stretch at best.,
Perhaps one of the major critiques of the President's reliance on the
old AUMF is that many would say the militant group ISIS "is no
longer part of the al-Qaeda 'associates' envisioned by the military
authorization passed after the September 11, 2001 attacks."7' 9
The Authorization to Use Military Force was passed,
unsurprisingly, within a week of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This AUMF is
divided into three parts: five perambulatory clauses, one section
delineating the granted authority, and one section placing the
authorization within the rubric of the War Powers.80 It allows the
President to:
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations of persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons."
While this AUMF authorized the use of "necessary and proper
force" against those responsible for the September 11, 200,1 attacks,

77. Id.
78. Deb Riechman & Nedra Pickler, Obama to Send His New War Powers Request to
Capitol Hill, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 10, 2015, 12:17 PM), http://www.newsmax.c
om/Newsfront/obama-to-send-war/2015/02/I 0/id623777/.
79. Greg Miller & Karen Young, In Syria, Obama Stretches Legal and Policy
Constraints He Created for Counterterrorism, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2015, 12:23 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationaI-security/in-syria-obama-stretches-legaland-policy-constraints-he-created-for-counterterrorism/2014/09/2379fdaf44-4339-1 I e49al5-137aa0153527_story.html.
80. Beau Marnes, Reauthorizing the "War on Terror": The Legal and Policy
Implicationsof the A UMF's Coming Obsolescence, 211 MIL. L. REV. 57, 68 (2012).
81. § 2, 115 Stat. at 224.
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Congress was not authorizing the President to use "military action
against terrorists generally."8
President Obama did not formally request authorization for the
use of military force against ISIL until February of 2015:
I have directed a comprehensive and sustained
strategy to degrade and defeat ISIL .... Although
existing statutes, [i.e. Public Law 107-40 and Public
Law 107-243], provide me with the authority I need to
take these actions, I have repeatedly expressed my
commitment to working with the Congress to pass a
bipartisan authorization for the use of military force
Consistent with this
(AUMF) against ISIL.
commitment, I am submitting a draft AUMF[83] that
would continue use of military force to degrade and
defeat ISIL. 4
Under the draft authorization, titled "The Authorization for Use
of Military Force against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,"
the President is authorized to use United States armed forces "as the
President determines to be necessary and appropriate against ISIL or
associated persons or forces ... consistent with the War Powers
Resolution." ' Furthermore, this authorization "does not authorize
the use of the united States Armed Forces in enduring offensive
ground combat operations... [and this authorization] shall terminate
three years after the date of enactment of this joint resolution, unless
reauthorized."8 6 Additionally, the proposed authorization calls for
repeal of Iraq AUMF.8 This draft proposal came several moths after
United States armed forces began engaging in air-strikes in an effort
to weaken ISIL. Still, President Obama has continuously indicated
that the proposed resolution is "important not only for the [United

Beau, supra note 80, at 69 (citing GRIMMETT, supra note 28) (emphasis added).
Supra note 3.
Letter from President Obama for the Speaker of the House of Representatives
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, THE WHITE HOUSE: OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/11/letter
-president-authorization-use-united-states-armed-forces-connection.
85. Supra note 3.
86. Id.
87. Id.
82.
83.
84.
and the
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States] strategy against [ISIL], but also to the cohesion of an
international coalition. "88
Unsurprisingly, President Obama faced a wake a criticism from
Democrats and Republicans alike after submitting his draft proposal
to Congress: "[t]he initial reaction by lawmakers suggested a rare case
in which Republicans wanted to provide [President] Obama more
leeway than did members of his own party." 89
The President has indicated that his draft proposal "provides the
military flexibility to conduct ground combat operations in limited
circumstances, such as rescue operations and special operations
against [ISIL] ... with the core objective to destroy ISIL." 9°
However, the draft proposal includes no geographic limitations "on a
possible extension of the war beyond those two countries in pursuit of
the Islamic State and 'associated persons or forces.' '9'
Still, the Speaker of the House, John Boehner, has indicated that
President Obama's request is "'the beginning of the legislative
process' of hearings, committee votes and amendments." '
Furthermore, Republicans have indicated that "the onus [is] on
[President] Obama to make the case for the authorization, both with
Congress and the broader country." 93 In this regard, it seems that the
draft proposal is far from what will be required for enough
congressional support to see the floor. The main concern for
Democrats seems to be that the draft proposal does not go far enough
to limit United States operations to fighting ISIL. 4 In this regard,

88. Carol Lee & Michael Crittenden, Debate Opens on New War Powers: Obama
Asks Congress to Back Islamic State Fight, THE WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015, 3:47PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articies/obama-asks-congress-to-authorize-military-action-againstislamic-state-1423666095.
89.

Id.

90.

Id.

91. Karen De Young, Obama Makes FormalRequest for War Authorization Against
Islamic State, THE WASH. POST (FEB. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nat
ional-security/obama-makes-formal-request-for-war-authorization-against-isamicstate
/2015/02/11/881 cc0b0-bl f7-1 1e4-886b-c22184f27c35-story.html.
92.

Lee & Crittenden, supra note 88.

93.

Id.

94.

Id.
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some Democrats are calling for more specific limitations with respect
to the use of ground forces.95
The current push and pull between Democrats and Republicans
in response to the draft proposal sent to Congress by President
Obama illustrates the difficulty of achieving bi-partisan support of a
congressional authorization to commit United States armed force
abroad. This ongoing debate is exactly what the WPR is intended to
facilitate. Insofar as the President and Congress enjoy overlap in
their war powers as conferred by the Constitution, the WPR is in
place to not limit their respective war powers, but to make sure that
both the President and Congress live up to their responsibility of not
acting entirely independent of the other branch. What is most
problematic about the current debate is that there seems to be little
justification for the President relying on the 2001 and 2002
Authorizations to Use Military Force in the first place-not only is
ISIL narrowly linked to al-Qaeda, 96 but those Authorizations to Use
Military Force were passed with the express purpose to combat the
terrorist groups who conducted the September 11, 2001 attacks, not
ISIL.
V. Strengthening the War Powers Resolution
The current debate regarding President Obama's handling of
ISIL in the context of the WPR highlights that perhaps the biggest
hurdle to improving the WPR is that congressional leaders and the
executive branch have been unable to come to an agreement with
respect to enacting mutually acceptable changes to the WPR. 97 This
95. For example, ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, Adam
Schiff, indicated that "a new authorization should place more specific limits on the use of
ground troops to ensure we do not authorize another major ground war without the
President coming to Congress to make the case for one." Carol Lee & Michael
Crittenden, Debate Opens on New War Powers: Obama Asks Congress to Back Islamic
State Fight, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/

obama-asks-congress-to-authorize-military-action-against-islamic-state-1423666095.
96. Al-Qaeda has all but separated themselves from the aggressive actions taken by
ISIL in recent months. See Swati Sharma, Islamic State Was Dumped by al-Qaedaa Year
Ago. Look Where it is Now, THE WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost

.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/02/03/the-islamic-state-was-dumped-by-al-qaeda-a-year-ag
o-look-where-it-is-now/.
97. This is not for a lack of trying-take, for example, the 104th Congress; Grimmett
points out that "President Clinton, in Presidential Decision Directive 25 signed May 3,
1994, supported legislation to amend the Resolution... to establish a consultative
mechanism and also eliminate the [sixty] day withdrawal provisions. Although many
agreed on the consultation group, supporters of the legislation contended the time limit
had been the main flaw in the War Powers Resolution, whereas opponents contended the

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 43:2

stems not only from tension between differing ideology in the area of
foreign policy and war powers, but also a differing interpretation of

what war powers the Constitution provides to Congress and the
President respectively.98 Still, it is important to highlight that the
WPR "reinforces presidential self-restraint and serves as a constant
reminder that policies involving the use of force overseas must garner
support beyond the short-term. ' 99
Perhaps the most important aim of the WPR is requiring the
President to consult with Congress in "every possible instance."' ° As
Vance points out, this goal "is a contemporary reaffirmation of the
Framer's conviction that, while sometimes awkward and
inconvenient, a system of political principles including especially
'separation of powers' and effective 'checks and balances' is a

necessary precaution against the abuse of unfettered power in the
hands of any one individual."' '1 In this regard, Vance envisions the
consultation requirement °0 to mean:
1. Giving congressional leadership "all information
about a placed action that is material to a judgment
about its advisability;"
2. Providing congressional leadership information
"sufficiently in advance of the planned action to
permit a reasonable opportunity to absorb the
information, consider its implication, and for a

judgment before irrevocable decisions are made by
the President;" and
3. Providing congressional leadership the "opportunity

to communicate its views to the President or at least
to his closest advisors."'

3

time limit provided the teeth of the Resolution. The difficulty of reaching consensus in
Congress on what action to take is reflected in the fact that in the 104th Congress, only
one measure, S.5, introduced January 4, 1995, by then Majority Leader Dole was the
subject of a hearing. S. 5, if enacted, would have repealed most of the existing War
Powers Resolution. An effort to repeal most of the War Powers Resolution in the House
on June 7, 1995, through an amendment to the Foreign Assistance and State Department
Authorization Act for FY1996-97 (H.R. 1561) by Representative Hyde, failed (201-217)."
See GRIMMETr, supra note 28, at 24.
98. See supra Part 11I.
99. Vance, supra note 30, at 90.
100. 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (emphasis added).
101. Vance, supra note 30, at 90.
102. 50 U.S.C. § 1543.
103. Vance, supra note 30, at 91.
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While various recommendations have been made with respect to
redefining the consultation requirement, none have been enacted.',
With this in mind, it might prove beneficial to establish a consultation
group to meet with the president when military action is being
considered.' 5 Implementing a more formal procedure by which the
President is to go about consulting with Congress will provide a
meaningful liaison between the President and Congress that will not
only be more efficient but also provide for more meaningful dialogue.
In addition, it might prove beneficial to improve consultation
between the President and Congress by broadening the areas where
consultation is necessary under the WPR.' °6 This is particularly
important in consideration of the modern makeup of hostilities
abroad, such as the case with ISIL.
A second improvement would be to shorten or eliminate the
time limitation under the congressional actions and procedures
section of the WPR.' Under the WPR, United States armed forces
are to be withdrawn within sixty days after a report is submitted to
Congress by the President, assuming express approval is not granted
by Congress.0'° Furthermore, the President is given an additional
thirty days after the expiration of the sixty day period to withdraw
armed forces from conflict.' °
Grimmett points out that some
opponents of the WPR argue that this time frame is too long. "° The
concern is that once United States armed forces have been committed
to armed conflict for such a long period, it become strategically and
politically more difficult for Congress to use the WPR in an effort to
end Presidential commitments of United States armed forces
104. See id.; see also GRIMMEYT, supra note 28.
105. See e.g., S.J. Res. 323, 100th Cong. (1988) (Proposed that the President regularly
meet with a group of 6-comprised of the majority and minority leaders of the House and
Senate, Speaker of the House, and Senate President pro tempore.
Following a
Presidential request from this group of 6, the President would the consult with a
permanent consultative group of 18 members---consisting of the leadership as well as the
ranking majority and minority members of the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed
Services, and Intelligence); see also H.R. 3405, 103rd Cong. (1993) (Proposed the
establishment of a Standing Consultative Group within the Congress to facilitate
improved interaction between the executive branch and the Congress with respect to the
use of U.S. military force abroad).
106. See GRIMMETT, supra note 28.
107. 50 U.S.C. § 1544.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See GRIMMETT, supranote 28.
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abroad."' As an alternative, a shorter time period in which the
President must comply would facilitate further consultation between
the President and Congress, and ultimately give Congress better
ability to curtail otherwise unilateral action taken by the President."'
An even more extreme alternative with respect to shortening or
eliminating the sixty to ninety day time limitation... would be to
return to the original language of the WPR passed by the Senate
before the WPR became law.'
This would require "prior
authorization" for the introduction of forces into conflict abroad
without a declaration of war except to respond or forestall an attack
against the United States or its forces to protect U.S. citizens while
evacuating them."' In effect, this would eliminate the problematic
sixty to ninety-day withdrawal requirement."' Opponents of this view
feel that such a strong limitation on Presidential action might not
allow the needed speed or action and provide adequate flexibility in
other circumstances."' On the other hand, it is possible that the
President could still take advantage of the forestalling an attack
against the United States requirement.""
If nothing else, the WPR should be amended to include both a
geographic as well as a temporal limit on all Authorizations to Use
Military Force granted by Congress. In the context of the ISIL
debate, one of the major concerns is that President Obama relied on
the Authorizations to Use Military Force that were passed nearly
fifteen years ago." 9 Insofar at the WPR is in place to facilitate the
President consulting with Congress before it commits United States
armed forces abroad, it is counterintuitive to allow the President to
rely on outdated, and seemingly inapplicable, constitutional
authorizations to start yet another conflict abroad. 2 ° Rather, the
president should be required, under the WPR, to indicate some sort
of time limitation in relation to the congressional authorization to use

111.
112.

Id.
Id.

113.

See50U.S.C. § 1544.

114. See GRIMMETY, supra note 28 (Senator Thomas Eagleton made this proposal in
1977; this proposal has been made several times since).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
120. See supra Part V.
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military force abroad-similar to the three year time limitation set up
by President Obama in his draft proposal for AUMF against ISIL."2 '
By providing such a limitation, an amended WPR would further
facilitate the consultation requirement that the WPR policy calls
for. 122

Conclusion
While the United States Constitution divides war powers
between the President under Article II, Section 2,123 and to Congress
under Article I, Section 8,"' it is not always clear where the
presidential war powers end and congressional war powers begin. In
the wake of the Vietnam War, Congress passed the War Powers
Resolution with the primary goal of facilitating a more cohesive effort
between the President and Congress with respect to their war
powers.12 Specifically, the WPR set up a procedural mechanism
calling for the President to consult with Congress before committing
United States armed forces to long-term conflicts abroad. While a
novel concept, the WPR has not proven to be as beneficial as its
drafters envisioned-the recent conflict against ISIL highlights the
WPR's short-comings. Realizing that any changes to the WPR are
difficult, and inevitably political, this Note proposes various ways to
strengthen the WPR.
First, the Note proposes that the consultation requirement of the
WPR is redefined so as to require a team to serve as a liaison between
the President and Congress. Second, this Note proposes that the
withdrawal period be shortened from the current sixty to ninety day
timeframe; in the alternative, the withdrawal period should be
removed altogether-in this case the WPR should be amended so as
to reflect the language provided by the initial Senate version of the
WPR. Finally, this Note proposes that both a geographic limit as well
as temporal limit be implemented so as to curtail the improper and
long-standing use of "authorized" war powers-such as Obama's
reliance on the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations to Use Military Force
as justification for his military action against ISIL.
121. Draft authorization: Authorization for Use of military Force against the Islamic
State and the Levant, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/site

s/default/files/docs/aumf_-02112015.pdf.
122.

See 50 U.S.C § 1541.

123.
124.

See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.

125.

See supra Part III.
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These changes would significantly increase the viability of the
WPR in the modern word. Moreover, these changes will better align
the practice of using the WPR as a meaningful mechanism by which
the President and Congress work together to make decisions
regarding committing United States armed forces abroad.

